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The Mayflower, the Rapsody and 
other ,recent company law cases 
Company law means much more than the Companies Act of 1995. Other 
laws contribute important additions to the subject. Significant examples are 
the Malta Stock Exchange Act and the Investments Services Act. Another 
important part is also played by the type of advice that lawyers give to their 
clients and how these laws are generally interpreted and applied in practice. 
Court decisions are another potentially significant source of guidance and 
interpretation. They apply legal principles to the facts presented before the 
court by the parties in dispute. 
I t is not always easy to update oneself on judgements and decisions taken by local courts and other relevant tribunals. They 
are not always easily available. The pur-
pose of this article is to highlight selected 
recent decisions of Maltese courts which are 
directly related to company law. These deci-
sions help to throw some light on corners 
I 
where the law in its traditionally general 
application cannot easily reach. Actual cases 
serve to flesh out the often bare rules of cor-
porate legislation. A studied well-prepared 
judgement may often prove as precious and 
instructive as the law itself. 
This Article shall outline four recent court 
decisions which provide us with the benefit 
of novel interpretations and give guidance 
on how some basic company law principles 
should be applied in practice. All these deci-
sions are relevant to those whose work 
brings them into contact with persons who 
own or manage companies. 
Two cases disclose the surprising extent to 
which company directors often fail to distin-
guish between corporate and personal prop-
erty and obligations. One decision relates to 
difficulties encountered in the appointment 
of directors in a particular situation. Indeed, 
an ever-growing concern of modern compa-
ny law relates to director performance and 
behaviour, which form a part of a broader 
area of interest often referred to collectively 
as Corporate Governance. Corporate gover-
nance is slowly becoming rather over-used 
and now risks to mean only what the user 
wants it to mean. Indeed, it has no precise 
legal meaning, and in fact is often used in 
different circumstances. Nonetheless, it is a 
useful concept which must, at the very least, 
be taken to require company directors to act 
properly, competently and in good faith in 
the best interests of the company within the 
confines of their legitimate powers under the 
law. Some of these rules may be found in 
legislation, particularly the Companies Act 
of 1995. However, for the concrete applica-
tion of these rules to particular circum-
stances, one may have to seek out court 
judgements and similar decisions. 
(l) Migdal Insurance co. Ltd. Et v. 
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Abrador S.A. and Konda Assets S.A. et 
decided by the Civil Court on the 18th May 
2001 (W/S 2106/1998) 
Summary: Resuscitation of a company 
which has been struck off the Register; court 
establishes fraudulent intent behind the volun-
tary liquidation and consequential winding-up 
of a company when arbitration proceedings 
were pending against it; court orders it placed 
back on the Register exclusively for · the pur-
pose of the arbitration proceedings. 
It all started with the Mayflower. 
Readers would surely recall the milestone 
event in 1620, when the good ship Mayflower 
crossed the Atlantic to land the first pilgrim-
colonizers from England on the new, largely 
uncharted territory of North America. They 
had a truly tough time there initially and half of 
them died of sickness within a year of their 
arrivaL But the remaining passengers survived, 
and the rest, as the cliche' goes, is history. 
Our own local Mayflower case may not enjoy 
such historical significance, but it may be con-
sidered a milestone in the development of local 
company law. The decision tackled for the first 
time the possibility of company survival 
despite having been struck off the Register of 
Companies. A notion often dismissed as incon-
ceivable and fraught with risks. 
In the Maltese Mayflower case (full name -
Mayflower Property Company Ltd. v. Registrar 
of Companies decided by the Civil Court in on 
the 22ndjanuary 1999) , the Court had allowed 
the shareholders of a company to rectify a mis-
take in the scheme of distribution after the 
company had already been struck off. There, a 
piece of immovable property (an airspace) that 
had been inadvertently omitted and had conse-
quently not been assigned to anyone. The 
shareholders were allowed to reverse the proce-
dures in order to permit the correction 
required. The court had then studiously avoid-
ed using the term "revival" of the company or 
similar, but the effect of the remedy was the 
same. 
The Mayflower decision has now been con-
firmed and indeed developed further in the 
more recent Rapsody decision. 
The Rapsody case relates to a Maltese compa-
ny which owned a vesseL In the course of a 
particular voyage, the vessel sunk losing its 
cargo. The cargo owners sued the owners of 
the vessel and opened arbitration proceedings 
in terms of the charter-party agreement 
between them. The shareholders of the com-
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pany owning the vessel dissolved the company. 
The company was then wound-up and eventu-
ally its name was struck off the Register of 
Companies. The cargo-owners asked the 
Maltese court to order the annulment of the 
dissolution, the winding-up and the striking off 
in order to allow the arbitration to continue its 
course. 
As this case involved a private shipping com-
pany, the operative law was not the Companies 
Act but the Commercial Partnerships 
Ordinance. In neither law, however, is there a 
legal provision governing the possibility of 
reviving a company which has already been 
wound-up and struck off the Register. 
In the Rapsody case, the court identified bad 
faith on the part of the shareholders of the com-
pany. Quoting the old axiom fraus omnia cor-
rumpit, the court made it clear that no person 
should be allowed to take an advantage 
through his own bad faith. 
In its decision, the court ordered - limitedly 
in the interests of plaintiff - the cancellation of 
all the procedures that had been adopted for 
dissolving the company, for winding up its 
affairs and for striking it off the Register. It 
ordered the revival of the company, but only to 
the extent that was necessary for removing the 
harm done to plaintiff and for allowing plaintiff 
to resume the arbitration proceedings and to 
eventually execute the award, should it be 
favourable to him. All other parties were to 
remain unaffected by the remedy given to 
plaintiff, meaning that for the rest of the world 
Rapsody Shipping Limited was and remained 
struck off and was no longer in existence. 
A few questions arise out of this important 
decision. 
(a) Is it conceptually feasible for a company 
to be at the same time in a state of relative exis-
tence and relative non-existence? 
(b) A company is created by the free will of 
its shareholders. The law recognizes t'hat the 
free will of the shareholders can put arr end to 
a company and dissolve it. Is it proper for the 
courts to ignore and reverse a decision taken by 
the free will of a company's shareholders? . 
(c) Following dissolution, a company does 
not cease to exist but remains a living entity 
represented by its liquidator during the wind-
ing-up operation. The liquidator could repre-
sent the company in the arbitration proceed-
ings. It is arguable that the court could have 
limited its reversal to the winding up stage and 
stop short of cancelling also the shareholders' 
resolution to dissolve. 
(d) Should a court be allowed to force share-
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holders to retain a company in existence 
against their will, or to force persons to act as 
directors of a company against their will? 
(Th is case involved a Maltese company by the name of 
Rapsody Shipping Limited and its vessel which sank bore 
the unromantic name of "Grape One". The case was insti-
tuted against the shareholders of the company which were 
two foreign companies and against the company itself. 
Strangely it was not instituted also against the liquidator. 
The owners of the vessel are lodging an appeal from this 
decision.) 
(2) Autorentals v B. decided by the Court 
of Appeal on the 14th November 2000 (W/S ~ 
no. 344/95 JSP) 
SUMMARY: Corporate property employed 
to resolve a personal problem between a direc-
tor and his wife; highlights the anomalous 
results that may flow when personal issues are 
mixed with corporate property. The decision 
itself gives rise to certain doubts. 
H (a businessman) and W (his wife) had wit-
eluded a contract of personal separation in 
terms of the Maltese civil code. Under this con-
tract, H's company (plaintifO granted a life 
usufruct over a fiat to W on condition that she 
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did not re-marry or co-habit with another man 
in the flat. The usufruct allowed the enjoyment 
of the property to the beneficiary (the usufruc-
tuary) during her lifetime and did not entail the 
payment of any consideration. 
Plaintiff company requested the Court to dis-
solve the usufruct and to evict W on the ground 
that she had violated the cohabitation prohibi-
tion. Defendant pleaded that the conditions 
attached to the usufruct were invalid as they 
were not of a commercial nature and were con-
sequently ultra vires the company. The Civil 
Court held that the company had the necessary 
powers under the law to stipulate these types of 
conditions remarking that it could not be 
excluded that the usufruct served the interests 
of the company. 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Civil 
Court that a company had the necessary corpo-
rate capacity to enter into any act conducive to 
its business. Had this not been the case, the 
consequences would have been more far-reach-
ing and the entire grant of the usufruct would 
have been declared invalid. The Court of 
Appeal remarked that defendant was hardly the 
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legitimate person to attack the validity of the 
agreement once she had signed and benefitted 
from the contract. If anything, it was only the 
company's shareholders who may conceivably 
have had an interest to attack the gtant of the 
usufruct. 
It is interesting to note that 
(a) while the husband was not personally a 
party to the proceedings, he represented plain-
tiff company as its director and judicial repre-
sentative; 
(b) the court did not explain how a gratu-
itous grant of a usufruct to a director's wife 
upon a legal separation from her husband 
could be considered to be in the company's 
interest. 
(3) Rustica Limited v. N . Gatt decided by 
the Court of Appeal on the 27th October 
2000 (App. 60B/96) 
SUMMARY: A company's separate personali-
ty; Court strikes down a clumsy attempt to 
bypass the Salomon rule for the sake of oppor-
tunistic convenience 
Defendant had rented a store from plaintiff 
company for his business. The lease agreement 
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prohibited any form of sub-letting to third par-
ties. He later re-organised his business affairs 
and started operating as a company which took 
over the lease. The premises also served as the 
company's registered office. Plaintiff claimed 
that this amounted to a breach of the lease 
agreement prohibition. Defendant originally 
claimed that he was wrongly suited as he was 
no longer the tenant. However, he eventually 
admitted ceding the lease to his company but 
argued that as he was effectively the owner and 
operator of the business there had been in prac-
tice no transfer of the lease. The court rejected 
defendant's argument and ordered him to evict 
the premises. 
Facts of case may be indicative of a degree of 
confusion between private and corporate prop-
erty in the minds and conduct of directors and 
shareholders. 
( 4) C. Testaferrata Moroni Viani et v. 
Testaferrata Moroni Viani (Holdings) 
Limited et decided provisionally by the Civil 
Court on the 30th August 1999 (App. No. 
1711/99 GC). 
SUMMARY: Section 402 f the Companies Act; 
inability to elect directors; majority sharehold-
ers request remedy against unfair prejudice or 
oppression; court appoints a board of directors 
with independent chairman 
In this case, a company's Articles of 
Association established that all the directors 
were to serve until the next annual general 
meeting during which election of directors 
would then be held. To be elected directors, 
directors needed to gain seventy-five per cent 
of the votes. This vote was never reached and 
a dangerous stalemate arose. The annual gen-
eral meeting was never closed and the outgoing 
directors decided to continue in office. 
The majority shareholders with sixty per cent 
commenced an action under section 402 of the 
Companies Act (the unfair prejudice remedy 
section) requesting the court to confirm the 
present board of directors. 
The defendants who were the minority share-
holders pleaded that they could not be accused 
of oppressing the majority, and that therefore 
section 402 did not extend to the present cir-
cumstances. They were however prepared to 
accept a board appointed by the court to 
replace the current board in which they had no 
confidence. 
The court held that it was vital for the com-
pany to have a proper board of directors, and in 
the circumstances it was just and equitable that 
the court should proceed to appoint a properly 
constituted board in the interests of all the 
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company's members who should be represented 
in equal measure. The court appointed a neu-
tral and experienced chairman together with 
two directors representing each of the two sides 
in the dispute. The chairman was to safeguard 
the interests of all the shareholders. The Court 
decreed that the Board was to meet not less 
than once a month and that no meeting could 
be held without the presence of the chairman. 
Where a director is absent from a meeting, the 
chairman would also have a casting vote. The 
chairman's remuneration was to be determined 
by a unanimous Board decision; in the event 
that no agreement is reached, the issue was to 
be referred to the court. 
Finally, the court decided that for the time 
being its orders were to remain of a provisional 
nature subject to review. After four months, 
the chairman was required to report to the 
court on the performance of the newly com-
posed board. 
(Eventually, some weeks following this court order, the 
shareholders reached an amicable agreement between 
them, which included the confirmation, by unanimous 
agreement between all the shareholders, of the composi-
tion of the board of directors as had been ordered by the 
civil court. On the basis of this settlement, the court pro-
ceedings were withdrawn.) 
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